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Abstract 
This thesis examines the extent to which lobbyists bring democratic value to the 
policy-formulation and decision-making stages of the EU policy process. It is 
examined through a single case study of the amendment of Directive 2001/83/EC.  
By adopting an actor-centered institutionalism perspective and through 
theoretical discussion on Robert Keohane, Fritz Scharpf and Pieter Bouwen, this 
thesis builds on the understanding of democracy as an institutional arrangement. It 
thus investigates lobbyists and the resources that constitute lobby influence, as a 
product of the demand by the EU institutions. The resources are defined as citizen 
support and economic power. The democratic value of lobby influence is related 
to the standard of representativeness, meaning that the lobbyists who influence the 
most in the specific parts of the policy process have to represent a broad array of 
citizens and societal actors. If influence is biased in favour of lobbyists with 
economic power as opposed to lobbyists with citizen support, then lobbyists do 
not bring democratic value to the EU policy process. 
By looking into empirical data the lobbyists exerting most influence are found 
and their interests located. Influence is measured through the preference 
attainment method and a coding of interests. The empirical data derives from 
online public consultations regarding the case as well as from a comparison of the 
preliminary consultation draft, the policy proposal and the final legislative act.  
The empirical analysis indicates that the lobbyists gaining most influence are the 
ones representing associations. Since it is associations with citizen support who 
exert most influence as opposed to individual companies with economic power, it 
is concluded that the lobbyists exerting most influence have representativeness. 
As representativeness reflects democratic value, the lobbyists influencing have 
democratic value. Lastly since all three EU institutions favoured trading influence 
with citizen support as opposed to economic power, it is concluded that lobbyists 
to a very large extent bring democratic value to the EU policy process. 
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1 Introduction 
When a policy is being made it commences with an issue being put on the 
political agenda. Once a decision has been made to address a specific issue, it is 
necessary for the European Commission1 to formulate a proposal for action. 
Hereafter if the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of the European 
Union2 decides on a policy decision, under co-decision, then the policy must be 
put into effect (Young 2010, p. 46).  This description of the different steps in the 
policy cycle refers to the roles of the formal institutions in the policy process. 
However, the policy of the European Union (EU) is a result of strategic 
interaction among several or many policy actors, these also include informal, yet 
privileged participants such as lobbyists, and these will be subject to scrutiny in 
this thesis.  
1.1 Problem Area 
Interest groups and lobbyists 
 
It is assumed that almost 20.000 separate interests and 26.000 interest 
organisations are represented in Brussels (Wind et al. 2012, p. 130).  The 
organised interests give input to the EU’s political system, and a lot of them are 
crucial for the output actually being implemented in the national political 
processes (Ibid). Where the term interest group has a positive connotation, the 
term lobbyist has more negative connotation (Eising et al 2010, p. 191; Kristensen 
2007, p. 11). Discussions concerning lobbying in the EU are often based on 
negative assumptions and some would even say prejudice (Kristensen 2007). 
Reality, however, is that we do not actually know that much about the work and 
influence of the lobbyists in the EU since it is not up for public display. A 
mandatory lobby register would allow for direct control with lobbyists. However, 
though not explicitly stated in such register, this thesis aims to evaluate lobby 
influence using theory and a case.  
 
In the following investigation, the term lobbyists will be used instead of interest 
groups, and specifically corporate lobbyists since it is a topic subject to a lot of 
mistrust from the citizens of the EU (Eurobarometer 2013).  This mistrust is 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1 Hereafter referred to as the Commission 
2 Hereafter referred to as the Council 
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entitled if EU policy is systematically biased in favour of some lobby groups with 
certain resources such as corporate lobbyists with substantial economic resources 
(access goods), as opposed to other lobbyists with different resources such as 
citizen support. If this is the case the democratic legitimacy of policy outcomes is 
seriously undermined (Klüver 2013; Bouwen 2004).  
 
 
The pharmaceutical lobby 
 
One kind of corporate lobbyists that has been very criticised are those of the 
pharmaceutical industry. Europe's pharmaceutical industry is essential because it 
employs around 700,000 people and stands for 17% of Europe's investments in 
research and development. Recently, the industry represented 10% of the EU's 
gross domestic product (EurActiv 2014).  According to statistics of the EU 
Transparency Register, the spending on lobbying activities by the pharmaceutical 
industry in the EU exceeds 40 million € a year (PMR 2015). Without an 
obligatory EU Transparency Register however, it is estimated that the 
expenditures would amount to the level of approx. 90 million € in total (Ibid). 
This makes the pharmaceutical industry and its lobbyists a very interesting case, 
wanting to study lobby group influence in the EU.  
 
The credibility of the pharmaceutical industry was seriously harmed after the 
great case of AstraZeneca (Commission 2005).  In the case the Anglo-Swedish 
group AstraZeneca was fined 60 million € by the Commission for misusing the 
patent system and the procedures for marketing pharmaceuticals to block market 
entry for generic competitors to its ulcer drug Losec (Ibid). The mistrust 
surrounding the pharmaceutical industry after AstraZeneca is a product of a 
pharmaceutical company’s misuse of EU law after implementation, but it does not 
tell us anything general about the act of pharmaceutical lobby groups in the 
policy-making process. Therefore this thesis investigates if the general mistrust in 
the pharmaceutical industry and its lobby groups has ground in reality. The 
misuse of the procedures for marketing pharmaceuticals in AstraZeneca was a 
breach of Directive 65/65 later replaced by Directive 2001/83/EC on falsified 
medicines. This thesis looks into the single case of the amendment of Directive 
2001/83/EC concluded after AstraZeneca. This is done in order to tease out if the 
final outcome of the amendment was in fact in favour of the lobbyists from large 
pharmaceutical companies with large economic resources but with less citizen 
support. Or if the influence was more equally divided between different kinds of 
lobbyists with different resources representing a substantial amount of citizens, 
and thus had democratic value in the EU policy-making process as envisioned by 
the Commission. 
 
 
Coping with the democratic deficit 
 
Throughout the history of the EU, the EP has been given more and more 
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competencies. This has been done in order to create a higher level of democratic 
credibility, but the discussion of a democratic deficit in the EU is only getting 
more prominent (Graziano & Vink 2006, p. 161). Furthermore the Commission 
white paper on governance proposed ‘better involvement’ of civil society such as 
lobbyists by reason of efficient and democratic governance. The Commission 
launched the European Governance Whitepaper in 2001 as a result of growing EU 
scepticism. The White Paper proposed the opening of the policy-making process 
in order to get more people and organisations and thus interests involved in the 
EU policy-making process (COM OJ 2001, p. 2). In other words, the Commission 
argued that interests such as the ones represented by lobbyists have a positive 
influence on EU policy input as a mean to compensate for an otherwise 
representational deficit. But the question remains, if this is the case in reality? The 
Commission’s argument thus becomes a hypothesis worth testing and this leads 
me to the research question of this thesis: 
 
 
 
The above is the puzzle, and what this thesis aims to investigate in the case of the 
amendment of Directive 2001/83/EC.   
1.2 Purpose and Contribution 
The aim of the thesis is to explore the question of democracy in relation to the role 
of lobbyists.  Democracy was not the most salient discussion point during the 
creation of the EU; public support towards the EU integration process assumed 
democracy to be implicit through the national representatives in the Council, 
something often referred to as ‘permissive consensus’ (Hix and Høylund 2011, p. 
107). With continued integration, however, the idea of democratic legitimacy has 
gained potency in the public debate; if the EP is in fact the only democratically 
constituted European institution, can one then speak of democracy in the EU? 
And should the EU be measured according to traditional standards of democracy, 
or is it to be expected that direct democratic rule is impossible in a state of states? 
The term ‘democratic deficit’ is used to describe this debate, the main point of 
critique being that the EU is in fact deficient in democracy (Ladrech, 2010, p. 85). 
With the ever-expanding nature of the EU, the elitist institutional architecture is 
increasingly being scrutinized. To many it seems ironic that a supranational entity 
consisting of democratic states – some of which were among the first democracies 
in the world – should function in a highly technocratic way. Currently, the EU is a 
central agenda-setting institution, shaping the future of Europe and the member 
states, having a large influence on numerous areas of policy making (Bache et al. 
2011, p. 353). It is also an institution with little direct contact to the citizens, 
although it has a major direct effect on the livelihood of member state nationals. 
To what extent do lobbyists bring democratic value to the EU policy 
process in the policy formulation and decision making stages?   
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Furthermore it is an institution, which is often treated as though it is ‘far away’ 
and too complex to grasp, being at the same time hard to compare to a normal 
polity, with which people are otherwise somewhat familiar (Moravcsik 2008, p. 
333). This thesis does not want to discuss whether there is a democratic deficit or 
not, however, it aims to discuss and analyze if the Commission’s idea in order to 
cope with a possible democratic deficit is consistent with reality.  
 
As such, this study is quite narrow in focus, as it only evolves around one specific 
case and only in relation to the pharmaceutical lobby. Nevertheless the overall 
focus on lobbyists’ role in relation to democratic value is highly relevant to 
European Affairs, and takes part in academic debate surrounding lobby influence.  
 
The analysis is build on vast literature of interest group influence, power and 
democracy, however though I acknowledge the sui generis nature of the EU in 
relation to democratic theory, it is not treated as such theoretically. The focus is 
on democracy as an institutional arrangement and theory by Fritz Scharpf, Robert 
Keohane and Pieter Bouwen. The ambition thus becomes to identify the lobbyists 
with access to the policy processes that influence the policy process, and analyse 
the resources that constitute their influence.  Their resources and thus influence is 
a product of the demand by the EU institutions, and these will be held up against a 
deduced standard of democratic value: representativeness in relation to equality.  
 
In order to guide this research, the following sub-question will be answered:  
SQ: Do the EU institutions favour lobbyists with a specific set of resources?  
 
Overall, this thesis will contribute to the literature and the field of European 
Affairs by offering an empirical analysis of lobby influence and its possible 
democratic value in the EU policy process.  In end be, if the EP and other possible 
democracy facilitators such as the involvement of civil society and lobbyists is not 
able to create democracy in the functioning of the EU, it will all mean that the 
future of millions of European citizens is in fact in the hands of a mystified 
technocratic institution. It is therefore not only very relevant to examine the 
democratic value of lobbyists in the EU policy process - it is highly necessary. In 
the following section concepts related to the research question and sub question 
will be defined 
1.3 Concepts 
1.3.1 Lobbyists, interest groups and civil society 
According to Princen and Lelieveldt “a lobbyist is an individual engaged in 
attempts to influence governmental decision-making on behalf of an interest 
groups”(Princen et al. 2011, p. 129). An interest group is a group of people that 
share certain preference regarding outcomes of governmental decision-making; 
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they organize in order to influence the outcomes (Ibid). The Commission gathers 
interest groups under the definition of civil society (COM OJ 2001), this, 
however, could be misleading, since it could mean that all the interests and the 
will of citizens; individuals and organizations are always represented. The term 
lobbyists and the definition proposed above is therefore used in this thesis.  
Furthermore lobbyists are divided into three categories: The ones representing 
Associations; Companies and National authorities.  
1.3.2 Democratic value 
How we define democracy is always subject to a lot of conflicting perceptions. 
This will be discussed in more detail in the chapter on theory, however the 
democratic value of lobbyists in the EU policy process in this thesis is related to 
the representativeness and equality of the lobbyists involved. The quality of lobby 
involvement is less democratic if the lobbyists exerting most influence in 
negotiations do not have representativeness and represent a broad array of societal 
actors.  
1.3.3 Resources 
This thesis investigates if the EU institutions favour lobbyists with specific 
resources. The term “resources” is related to Pieter Bouwen’s theory on access-
goods. The EU institutions demand certain access goods from the lobbyists in 
return of influence; the EU policy process thus becomes a bargaining game 
between private and public actors. Instead of using the term access goods, these 
will be defined as resources, since I define them as citizen support and economic 
power. The chapter on theory will elaborate further on this.  
1.3.4 Influence and power 
Influence in this thesis will be defined as power. Influence can be measured when 
A gets B to do something B otherwise would not have done, i.e. A changes the 
behaviour of B (Dahl 1957 in Lukes 2005, p. 16). Influence is further evaluated 
from the preference attainment method; this will be described in more detail in the 
chapter on methodology. The lobbyists exerting most influence in the policy 
process are seen as the ones having most power. I argue that the EU institutions 
define the distribution of power in the EU, however it becomes interesting to 
investigate how democratic this distribution of power actually is.  
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1.4 Previous research 
Previous research has aimed at explaining influence in policy processes. Nelson 
Polsby for instance argues that “identifying who prevails in decision-making 
seems the best way to determine which individuals and groups have more power 
in social life, because direct conflict between actors presents a situation most 
closely approximating an experimental test of their capabilities to affect 
outcomes” (Polsby in Lukes 2005, p. 16).  This thesis aims to do the same, 
however where previous researchers have looked at the concept of influence in 
relation to access, in this thesis the actual influence is researched.  
1.4.1 Method 
Influence in its broadest form is understood as an actor’s ability to shape a 
decision in line with his/her preferences, or, in other words, ‘a causal relation 
between the preferences of an actor regarding an outcome and the outcome itself’ 
(Dür 2008, p. 561). Measuring the influence of lobbyists in the EU policy process, 
however, has proven rather difficult. These difficulties mean that only few studies 
have attempted to measure lobby influence (Ibid, p. 560). Andreas Dür explains 
distinct problems that hamper the measurement of influence: Two of them are the 
existence of different channels of influence, and the occurrence of counteractive 
lobbying (Ibid, p. 561).  Inspired by Heike Klüver this thesis assesses lobbyists’ 
degree of preference attainment throughout the decision-making and policy-
formulation stages of the policy process. In the preference attainment method, the 
outcomes of political processes are compared with the ideal point of actors (Ibid, 
p. 566). The idea is that the distance between an outcome and the ideal point of an 
actor reflects the influence of this actor. Klüver further tries to control for the 
resources behind the actors, affecting their bargaining power and moving 
outcomes closer to the actor’s ideal point (Ibid.).  In this way one gets around the 
problems as explained by Dür (Ibid, p. 561): The different channels of influence 
otherwise hard to cover, are covered since the preference attainment method 
enables the measurement of the influence, since influence should by definition be 
observed in the policy outcome (Klüver 2013, p. 62). Second the occurrence of 
counteractive lobbying is taken into consideration since the method is only used to 
display the lobbyists who actually get their interests through, this does not mean 
that the ”losers” lacked influence, but simply that another lobby group maybe 
with a specific set of resources and thus bargaining power gained more influence.  
 
The agenda setting stage in the EU policy process is left out of scope in this 
thesis, this poses a limitation according to Bachrach and Baratz since they present 
another view on power and influence, in which they include the fact that power is 
also exercised when “A creates or reinforce social and political values and 
institutional settings that limit the scope of political process to public 
consideration of only those issue which are comparatively equal to the interests of 
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A”  (Barach and Baratz in Lukes 2005, p. 20). The agenda setting stage would 
thus be where some issues are organized into politics, while others are organized 
out, the latter is referred to as “nondecision-making”(Ibid). Nevertheless this is 
almost impossible to measure, since this kind of lobbyism is hidden from public 
display, and thus it has been left out of scope.  
 
Robert Dahl’s method is quite similar to the method used in this study since he 
determines for each decision, which participants had initiated alternatives that 
were finally adopted (Lukes 2005, p. 17). These actions were then tabulated as 
individual “successes” or “defeats”. By this pluralistic approach, just like this 
research, an attempt was made to study specific outcomes in order to determine 
who prevails in decision-making (Ibid.). Robert Dahl argues that identifying ”who 
prevails in decision-making seems the best way to determine which individuals 
and groups have more power in social life, because direct conflict between actors 
presents a situation most closely approximating an experimental test of their 
capacities to affect outcomes” (Dahl 1963 in Lukes 2005, p. 18). Conflict is 
meant as a conflict of preferences, and interests are to be understood as policy 
preference (Ibid). Though I acknowledge that interest might be unarticulated or 
unobservable and people might actually be mistaken about or unaware of their 
own interests, a feasible way to study power and influence in this thesis involves a 
focus on outspoken behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which 
there is an observable conflict of interests, seen as express policy preferences, 
revealed by political participation (Lukes 2005, p. 19). The focus in this research 
as well as Dahl’s is thus on observable behaviour and from this influence and 
power is measured.   
1.4.2 Theory 
In relation to the chosen theoretical framework of rational institutionalism, Fritz 
Scharpf explains how “…Social phenomena are to be explained as the outcome of 
interactions among intentional actors – individual, collective, or corporate actors, 
that is – but that these interactions are structured, and the outcomes shaped, by 
the characteristics of the institutional settings within which they occur.” (Scharpf 
1998, p. 1).  In this sense, just as elite-pluralists would argue, I agree that the EU 
as an institution limits the access to the policy process.  
 
Theorists of Elite-pluralism explain how elite-pluralism happens because the 
policy-process, despite claimed intentions of broader consultation, remains 
dominated by big commercial interests (Greenwood 2007). It is assumed that 
more than 70 % of EU interests representations with access to the Commission are 
trade- and commercial interest (Wind 2012, p. 132). However where the access to 
EU institutions and policy processes is displayed as mostly open to commercial 
interests, another question is if access equals influence. This thesis evaluates the 
lobbyists gaining influence in the policy formulation and decision-making process 
and discovers what constitutes the “winners” of negotiations in the case chosen in 
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terms of their influential resources. The so-called elite-pluralistic access argument 
thus becomes less important in relation to this research, as long as the lobbyists, 
who actually engage and influence in the policy process, represent the interests of 
a substantial amount of citizens, and if the policy input from lobbyists is in fact 
divided between lobbyists representing different kinds of societal interests. In 
other words, this thesis does not aim to research whether lobbyists are “good or 
bad”, but simply if the institutional framework they are being part of in my case 
facilitates good democratic quality, as argued by the Commission.  
 
In relation to the discussion on democracy, Dimitris Chryssochoou distinguishes 
between two forms of democratic deficit, these being the socio-psychological and 
the institutional. The two aspects are connected and take its point of departure in 
Arblaster and Scharpf (Chryssochoou 2010, p. 379). Arblaster stresses the 
importance of the demos, and that it is not only the people, but also an idea of a 
political community of shared values and identities (Arblaster 1987 in 
Chryssochoou 2010, p. 379). However, the Socio-psychological perspective is left 
out of account in this thesis because I agree with Robert Keohane and Ruth Grant 
in that there is a general absence of a well-defined global or European public, as 
well as a European demos3 on a transnational level in contrast to the demos one 
talks about in a domestic democracy (Keohane et al. 2005, p. 6). In other words 
“States, subunits of states, multinational firms, and NGOs were all created 
without any act of authorization at all or without having been authorized to act by 
any set of entities even remotely representative of the EU population as a whole.” 
(Ibid.).   In the EU it can therefore be argued there is a lack of a ‘civic we-ness’, 
which is a sense of common identity amongst Europeans and vital in the creation 
of a European demos. In this case, the demos would be a transnational one where 
the citizens share an active interest in policy making and are able to direct their 
democratic claims and rights via central institutions (Chryssochoou, 2010, p. 382). 
But since there is no demos in the EU to provide the EU with legitimacy, at least 
not even remotely close to the ones in the nation states, and since this thesis aims 
to investigate lobby groups, who act beyond nation states, it would be unwise to 
consider the socio-psychological aspect in terms of the EU’s democracy. This is  
because it is a concept one can argue is mostly connected to the nation state. The 
focus will thus be on democracy as an institutional arrangement.  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
3 A lack of Demos means that the people of the nation-states do not have a feeling of a common 
European identity 
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2 Theory  
In the first part of this chapter, I introduce the theoretical framework of actor-
centered institutionalism to guide my analysis insofar as to understand the 
function of an institution like the EU and the actions of the actors herein. I further 
introduce Bouwen’s theory on access-goods, from this I am able to answer the 
question: What kind of influential resources could constitute a lobbyist having 
more influence than another in the policy-formulation and decision making stages 
in the EU policy process? However, not if one kind of resource is favoured more 
than others by the EU institutions? This question will be answered in the 
analytical chapter in order to conclude on the democratic value of the inclusion of 
lobbyists in the EU policy process. In the second part of the chapter, I undertake a 
normative theoretical discussion on the concept of democracy. The question: 
What determines democratic value? And the sub question: What constitutes a 
good quality of democracy in terms of equality and representativeness? Will be 
answered. I shall use the discussion in order to conclude on a final standard of 
democratic value, necessary for me to establish in order to evaluate the 
democratic potential of Lobby group participation in the EU policy process, while 
at the same time grasp the manifold nature of the concept of democracy.  
 
2.1 The role of institutions 
The point of departure is in Fritz W. Scharpf’s Actor-Centered Institutionalism in 
Policy Research and its key components in relation to this research. Scharpf labels 
the framework that has shaped his research Actor- Centered institutionalism. By 
this, he recognizes the importance of combining actor-centered and institution-
centered approaches in an integrated framework (Scharpf 1998, p. 36). The theory 
guiding this research is deduced from Pieter Bouwen’s theory on access goods, 
but actor-centered institutionalism is the overall framework and starting point for 
analysis; access goods theory is thus a component of the framework. The theory 
guides the search for the explanations to who succeeds in getting their interests 
through in the EU policy process. I further use theory by Robert Keohane. 
Keohane agrees with Scharpf to a large extent, in that rational-choice and 
institutionalism are equally important when considering international 
organizations or international regimes, however, Keohane’s theory is only 
considered to argue in favour of the importance of international institutions in 
world politics; a position necessary to adopt in this research in order to create a 
rigid framework for the research and specific focus (Keohane 1984, p. 63). But it 
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is questioned whether institutions such as the EU always make mutually 
beneficial agreements for a number of diverse citizens and the lobbyists, who 
represent them.   
 
Regimes such as the EU facilitate the making of substantive agreements by 
providing a framework of rules, norms, principles and procedures for negotiations 
(Keohane 1984, p.110). International regimes help to make the expectations of 
governments consistent with one another; these procedures help actors to 
overcome barriers to agreement. Regimes are thus developed because actors in 
world politics believe that with such arrangements they will be able to make 
mutually beneficial agreements that would otherwise be almost impossible to 
attain and this is why regimes are thought necessary  (ibid, p. 108).  
 
With his actor-centered institutionalism Scharpf integrates rational choice and 
structuralisms or institutionalist paradigms, which are being treated as mutually 
exclusive in the confrontation between economic and sociological theories 
(Scharpf 1998, p. 36). This fusion of paradigms, he argues, creates a better 
“goodness of fit” between theoretical perspectives and observed reality of political 
interaction, driven by “…the interactive strategies of purposive actors operating 
within institutional settings that, at the same time, enable and constrain these 
strategies.” (Ibid.). Actors will respond differently to external threats, constraints, 
and opportunities because they may differ in perception and preferences but also 
because they interact in a specific institutional setting (ibid, p. 37).  It thus 
becomes interesting to investigate the role of the institutions in shaping the 
outcome of negotiations in the amendment of Directive 2001/83/EC. 
 
2.1.1 Power 
Resources can be argued to define influence and power of actors and it may be 
suggested that all industries will exercise economic power in an attempt to shape 
regulatory frameworks to their advantage (Edgar 2012, p. 296).  According to 
Robert Dahl, power and influence almost have the same meaning and power is 
described as: A has the power over B to the extent that he can get B to do 
something that B would not otherwise do (Dahl 1957 in Luke 2005, p. 16). This 
statement refers to A’s capacity to the extent that he can get B to do something. 
Large national and multinational industries and their lobbyists may in addition be 
seen to have the ability to exert positive and negative sanctions on governments, if 
rational argument fails their purposes (Edgar 2012, p. 296). Most obviously, 
production or the sourcing of raw materials can be moved from one country or 
region to another, impacting upon local employment as well as personal income 
and tax revenues (Ibid.). Industry has power over government, if it can bring 
about a policy change that would not otherwise have happened. Equally, EU 
institutions have power over industry if they can prevent them from acting in a 
way that they otherwise would have done (Ibid.). Nevertheless the EU institutions 
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and the lobbyist are more interdependent and this complicates the classical notion 
of power. 
 
EU policy is a result of strategic interaction among several or many policy actors, 
“…each with its own understanding of the nature of the problem and the 
feasibility of particular solutions, each with its own individual and institutional 
self-interest and its own normative preferences, and each with its own capabilities 
of action resources that may be employed to affect the outcome” (Scharpf 1998, p. 
11). Scharpf argues how policy processes often involve a small number of 
individual and corporate actors. These actors are involved in purposeful, rational 
action under conditions in which the results are a joint product of their separate 
choices (Ibid, p. 5). In this line of thought Pieter Bouwen argues that private and 
public actors in the EU decision-making process become interdependent because 
they need resources from each other (Bouwen 2004, p. 340). The EU institutions 
demand certain resources crucial for their own functioning (Ibid). Bouwen calls 
these resources “access goods”. The private actors are responsible for the supply 
of the access goods, however they only gain access to an institution if that 
institution demands the access good provided (Ibid, p. 341). In a rational-choice 
theoretic line of thought one can argue that both the EU institutions and lobbyists 
wish to gain something from interaction. Interest groups seek influence, whereas 
the EU institutions require “access goods” in the form of policy-relevant 
information (Greenwood 2007, p. 338).  It is not all lobbyists who have policy-
relevant information, only those who have citizen support and economic power, 
the next section will elaborate on these resources.  
2.1.2 Resources 
This thesis concentrates on the lobbyists representing associations, companies and 
national associations. The difference between associations and companies is that 
associations are membership organizations that have individuals, companies, 
public institutions, or other associations as members. Companies on the other 
hand are corporate actors and do not have any members. Associations and 
companies thus have different internal structures and different functions and their 
pathway to survival is different (Klüver 2013, p. 26). Associations wish to ensure 
their survival. To do so, they strive for members because these are the main 
resource providers. In order to attract and retain members, they provide special 
services to them and seek to maximize their political influence on legislators so 
that the policy outcome is as close as possible to the policy preference determined 
by their members (Ibid.). Companies are by contrast non-membership 
organizations whose function is the production of goods and services, which they 
trade in order to make profits (Ibid.). The main resource providers for companies 
are customers who buy their goods and services. Companies therefore compete for 
customers and strive for high profits, this ensure their survival (Ibid, p. 28). 
Companies are only able to survive if the profits are higher than the costs they are 
facing. Since high profits guarantee the survival of companies, the role-specific 
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interest of companies is the maximization of their profitability (ibid.). Thus 
associations and companies both want to ensure their survival. But where 
associations have to attract members, who control the flow of resources, 
companies have to maximize their profitability (Ibid, p. 29). Associations can 
draw on two strategies to attract and retain members: They can maximize their 
political influence and they can provide services to members (Ibid.). Companies 
can choose from a set of three different strategies: They can acquire new 
customers, they can reduce costs, which are internal to their production process, 
or they can influence policy-making in order to bring about a more favourable 
regulatory environment (Ibid.). Hence, maximizing political influence is an 
important strategy for associations as well as companies and thus both lobby the 
European institutions in order to influence the policy-making process.  
 
Their level of resources decides the bargaining power of lobby groups. It is 
however, not necessarily the same resources that all EU institutions want. 
According to Heike Klüver the Commission needs the before mentioned expert-
knowledge in order to make the best policy-proposal, but both the EP and the 
Council’s first priority can be argued to be citizen support since these two 
institutions are directly elected and depend on this resource for survival, it thus 
becomes interesting to see which resources and thus what interests of what actors 
prevail in negotiations  (Greenwood 2007, p. 338; Klüver 2013, p. 32-39).  
 
Both the Commission, the Council and the EP demand economic power from 
lobby groups in return of influence because they are responsive to concerns raised 
by companies that control an important economic sector; job creation and 
business investments than they are to interest groups that do not (Klüver 2013, p. 
49). It could thus be argued that both economic resources and citizen support 
represent specific policy-relevant information in the sense that economic 
resources enables expensive know-how and expertise, and that citizen support 
represent a substantial number of voter-positions necessary for re-elections in the 
national or supranational arena. However, where a high number of represented 
citizens reflects a certain kind of democratic representativeness, economic power 
does not necessarily do the same. This thesis thus investigates if individual 
corporate lobby groups with substantial economic power influence more in the 
policy process than lobbyists representing associations, who represent a higher 
number of diverse citizens. 
 
The discussion on theories is related to causality and the driving resources 
affecting the “winners” of influence in the policy-formulation and decision 
making stages. The driving resources are being exemplified as economic 
resources and citizen support. The resources are extensive and incorporate many 
aspects affecting the bargaining position of the lobbyists. In the choice of 
resources, I have been looking into previous research and theories, and have found 
these two factors to be the ones most important in relation to the focus on 
democratic representation and influence.  
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2.2 Democratic value 
The role of democracy in a supranational relation and how to evaluate the quality 
of democracy in such setting is rather normative in nature, theorists disagree as to 
whether there is in fact a democratic deficit in the EU, and if so, to what extent 
and how it can be identified. Measuring the degree of democracy in the EU as 
whole, however, is difficult due to the complexity of the institutional 
infrastructure and the variation in the nature of the different institutions; the 
Commission, the Council and the EP are fundamentally different and intended to 
uphold each their areas within the functioning of the Union. Treating them as a 
whole would thus be an unsuccessful exercise. In general, it is difficult to 
measure, or even perceive, the degree of democracy or lack here of within the EU, 
simply due to the variety of academic approaches to the concept.  
2.2.1 Democracy as an institutional arrangement 
As mentioned in the section on previous research, Dimitris Chryssochoou 
distinguishes between two forms of democratic deficit, these being the socio-
psychological and the institutional. This thesis only focuses on the institutional.   
 
When democracy is defined as an institutional arrangement for making decisions, 
with the legitimacy of those resting on elections, then the institutions of 
democracy can be viewed as an end in itself in a democratic sense. Institutions 
thus become the means by which to realize democracy and the common good 
(Chryssochoou 2010, p. 379). Under modern (Western) conditions, legitimacy has 
come to rest almost exclusively on trust in institutional arrangements that are 
thought to ensure that governing processes are generally responsive to the 
preferences of the governed, this is referred to as input legitimacy, “government 
by the people” (Scharpf 2005, p. 1). This thesis builds on this understanding of 
democracy as an institutional arrangement and investigates lobbyists and the 
resources that constitute their influence, as a product of the demand by the EU 
institutions. In other words, if the institutional framework they are being part of in 
this case creates good democratic quality in relation to input legitimacy and the 
inclusion of lobbyists in the policy process.  
2.3 Input legitimacy 
Normative disagreement on the concept of “Democracy” remains a controversial 
subject in academic discussion and public debate (Schmidt et al 2004, p. 4). The 
concept is contested and associated with diverse ideal requirements and real-world 
institutions and practices (Ibid.). Democratic representation 
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linked to the state and, respectively, since the French Revolution, has been linked 
to the nation state. If that were all that matters, input legitimacy would be ensured 
by institutions maximizing either the direct participation of the governed in policy 
choices or the accountability of governors to the collective preferences of the 
governed (Scharpf 2005, p. 2). But the EU is neither a state nor a nation and 
consequently one has to rethink the concept of representation and ask which of the 
various conceptions of representation fit this very particular polity (Kohler-Koch 
2010, p. 101; Piattoni 2013; Keohane et al. 2005).  
 
Democratic representation is a crucial element in legitimate governance; however, 
even though the potential contribution of civil society to the democratic 
legitimacy of the EU is popular in academic and political discourse, one can argue 
it is not linked to the concept of representation (Kohler-Koch 2010, p. 101). The 
EU white paper on governance advocated ‘better involvement’ of civil society 
such as lobbyists by reason of efficient and democratic governance but did not 
relate to the wider issues of democratic legitimacy in the EU (Kohler-Koch 2010, 
p. 104).  
 
In order to discuss democratic representation it becomes interesting to look at the 
specific functions attributed to lobbyists. Pluralists would argue that competition 
and coalition between big numbers of lobby groups is a predominant governance 
mechanism in political systems (Eising 2009, p. 1169). The EU’s political process 
is characterised as being very open to external interests, EU institutions can be 
argued to be very input-dependent in relation to the surrounding society (Börzel 
2010, p. 203). Interest organisations and companies have the expertise and 
technical knowledge, which is crucial for especially the Commission, since the 
European administration is very understaffed (Wind 2012, p. 132). However, the 
democratic representation cannot always do this alone, but the input from 
functional specific interests, is very important in order for the input-flow to be as 
broad as possible. The access of interest groups into the political system can 
therefore be argued to affect the societal legitimacy of the system (Ibid.). Citizens 
are represented in EU policy-making by lobbyists; it is a case of representation 
built on the expression of preferences (Kohler-Koch 2010, p. 107).  
2.3.1 Representativeness 
One can argue that conceptually, governance and representation do not fit well 
together. This is true according to the perspectives on the division of power in the 
EU system (Börzel 2010; Kohler-Koch 2010, p. 104). This perspective argues that 
since the Commission’s competence is restricted to only initiating and executing 
EU policies, EU governance is mainly linked to the Commission and to the 
consultation of stakeholders: Stakeholders such as the ones represented by 
lobbyists. Furthermore since civil society and lobbyists have only a voice not a 
vote, democratic input legitimacy can be argued not to be at stake (Kohler-Koch 
2010, p. 104). The Council and the EP (in case of co-decision), however, have 
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decision-making authority, and consequently only these institutions have to live 
up to the standards of democratic representation (Ibid.). Democracy in the EU can 
thus be defined as an institutional arrangement for making decisions, with the 
legitimacy of those resting on elections, and the EU can be viewed as an end in 
itself in a democratic sense (Chryssochoou, 2010, p. 379). In other words, 
representation is important to the Council and the EP, but governance is important 
in relation to the Commission. Thus, democratic representation is not an issue of 
concern in relation to EU governance (Kohler-Koch 2010, p. 104).  
 
In this view, the Commission is not concerned with democratic representation; it 
is concerned with the representativeness of those who want to be consulted. 
‘Representativeness’ is an attribute of lobbyists; those who want to participate in 
policy-making have to prove that they are representative (Ibid, p. 110). 
Representativeness is an important issue in the Transparency Initiative and other 
initiatives of the Commission aimed at improving EU– civil society relations 
(Ibid.).  Political representativeness ensures that input from the lobbyists into the 
political system is sufficiently representative of the political community. The most 
important objective of representativeness is to ensure broad public acceptance, 
and as a result effectiveness of the policy of democratic institutions. In other 
words it should be impossible for actors with substantial economic power to fast-
track their influence without also being representative i.e. have citizen support.  In 
this way one can question the theory by Heike Klüver, in that the Commission 
could have just as great an interest in the resource of citizen support as the EP and 
the Council. This is because citizen support equals broad public acceptance and 
makes it easier for the Commission proposal to go through the EP and the Council 
in the co-decision procedure. The scope of Heike Klüver’s method will thus be 
expanded in the analysis to also include an evaluation of the representativeness of 
lobbyists exerting most influence in the analysis.   
2.3.2 Equality 
Another empirical question in relation to democracy concerns the democratic 
quality of the input process. In order to qualify as democratic, representation has 
to live up to the principle of equality (Kohler-Koch 2010, p. 110). Concerning the 
representativeness of the input process and the enacting of accountability, what 
actually constitutes representativeness is still highly disputed. The EU institutions, 
commissioned academics and Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are quite 
divergent in terms of criteria (Ibid.). Most common is the insistence on 
membership from a minimum number of EU countries (Ibid.) (Greer et al. 2011). 
This thesis look into the criteria of associations’ citizen support as opposed to 
companies’ economic power in order to “measure” the state of equality in the 
inclusion of lobbyists into EU policy process.  Economic power and citizen 
support was chosen because democratic representativeness also regards the 
plurality of societal actors involved in EU policy-making. The organizational 
capacity of societal interests is distributed unevenly and, due to the economic 
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origin of the EU, corporate lobbyists have forceful presence in Brussels (Kohler-
Koch 2010, p.110). In order to redress biased representation, the Commission 
supports so-called ‘weak interests’ by providing funds and by designing 
consultation mechanisms that lower the threshold of access (Greenwood 2007, p. 
342). Over the years the gap between economic and professional interest groups 
on the one side and general interest groups on the other has narrowed, but 
numerous case studies provide evidence that, in terms of social cleavages and 
territorial origin, representation is still unbalanced (Kohler-Koch 2010, p. 111; 
Greer et al. 2011). It is important to note that influence in itself does not equal 
democracy, however indicates whom the EU institutions are interested in trading 
influence for access goods with. The inclusion of lobbyists therefore has to be 
treated with caution from a normative standpoint. When evaluating the democratic 
value of lobby inclusion in the policy process it thus becomes important to stress 
that lobby participation can only enhance the democratic quality of supranational 
policy-making if influence is not systematically biased in favour of some interests 
as opposed to others constantly losing (Klüver 2013, p. 3). The necessity of a 
balanced presence of societal interests also means, that the lobbyists exerting most 
are not representative if influence is biased in favour of large companies as 
opposed to small, and medium-sized companies. The democratic added value thus 
differs in relation to the representativeness of the lobbyists and an overall 
balanced presence of societal interests (Kohler-Koch 2010, p. 107). In order to 
decide on the democratic potential of lobby group participation in European 
policy-making, an empirical assessment of lobby groups’ influence and the 
distribution of influence among them thus become necessary.  
 
2.4 Conclusion to theory 
In the first part of this chapter, I introduced my theoretical framework of actor-
centered institutionalism. According to this theory policy processes involve 
purposeful rational actors. Institutions such as the EU, however, facilitate the 
making of substantive agreements by providing a framework of rules, norms, 
principles and procedures for negotiations. Actors in world politics believe that 
such arrangements will produce mutually beneficial agreements, and thus 
institutions become necessary. However this thesis questions whether institutions 
always make beneficial agreements for a number of diverse citizens and the 
lobbyists who represent them.  
 
Pieter Bouwen and his theory on access-goods argues that public and private 
actors in the EU decision-making process are interdependent because they need 
resources from each other, lobbyists seek influence whereas institutions require 
access goods. It is argued that because of their reliance on election, citizen support 
is important for the EU institutions. Furthermore economic power is also of 
importance, since lobbyists having these resources control economic sectors, job 
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creation and business investments. I thus end up arguing that citizen support and 
economic power are influential resources which could constitute a lobbyist having 
more influence than another in the policy-formulation and decision making stages 
of the EU policy process.  
 
The second part of this chapter have concluded on a final standard to determine 
democracy in relation to the democratic value of Lobby groups participating in the 
EU policy process. Democracy in this study is defined as an institutional 
arrangement: The lobbyists exerting most influence and the quality of their 
democratic value are seen as products of what is demanded by the EU institutions.  
The EU is an institution, not a state, and should therefore neither be perceived as 
such. In terms of democratic representation only the Council and the EP have 
decision-making authority (in the case of co-decision), and only these have to live 
up to the standards of democratic representation. The Commission on the other 
hand only has the power of initiating and executing policies. Governance and not 
representation is thus linked to the Commission and the consultation of 
stakeholders such as lobbyists. The democratic value of lobbyists in the EU policy 
process is thus linked to the question of representativeness. The specific functions 
attributed lobbyists is to represent the different interests and views and to bring 
knowledge and experience of citizens into the policymaking process, the question 
of equal chance to influence for different kinds of lobbyists is therefore also 
important. A good quality of democracy in terms of the democratic added value of 
lobbyists thus differs in relation to the overall balanced presence of societal 
interests i.e. the democratic representativeness and equality of the lobbyists. 
 
In order to create an overview for the reader, the road to the analysis has been 
summed up in figure 2.1 on the next page. 
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ANALYSIS 
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Figure 2.1 Step-by-step figure of the theoretical arguments leading to analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Testing Commission hypothesis:  
Interests such as the ones represented by lobbyists have a 
positive influence on EU policy input as a mean to compensate 
for an otherwise representational deficit. 
Overall theoretical framework: Actor-centered 
institutionalism. 
EP, Council and Commission provide a framework of rules, 
norms, principles and procedures for negotiations. They demand 
resources in the form of citizen support and economic power 
from the lobbyists in trade for influence in the policy process. 
 
Democracy is thus defined as an institutional arrangement: 
Institutions become the means by which to realize democracy 
and the common good. The resources that constitute the 
lobbyists exerting most influence is a product of the demand by 
the EU institutions 
 
When the lobbyists exerting influence have 
representativeness in relation to equality: 
All societal actors should have a chance of influencing and 
influence should not be systematically biased in favour of 
interests with economic power as opposed to others with citizen 
support constantly losing. 
 
What constituted the actors exerting most influence in the 
case of the amendment of Directive 2001/83/EC? 
This answers the question of the lobbyists the institutions 
favours the most in relation to trading resources for influence 
with, and decides if the lobbyists exerting influence bring 
democratic value to the EU policy process. 
To what extent do lobbyists bring democratic 
value to the EU policy process in the policy 
formulation and decision making stages? 
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3 Methodology 
This section presents the methodological choices and considerations pertaining to 
the analysis. First it reflects on the single case study method applied and the 
theoretical framework, before focusing in particular on the chosen method of 
coding for interests.  
3.1 Strategy of analysis 
This thesis is a single case study. The case chosen is a critical case as it will allow 
for testing and a better understanding of the circumstances and processes in which 
the Commission’s hypothesis - that the inclusion of lobby groups foster input 
legitimacy - will or will not hold (Bryman 2008, p. 55). The case is the 
amendment of the Directive 2001/83/EC. The criteria for selection was that it is a 
case of the EU policy process in the area of pharmaceuticals, for which citizens of 
the EU are very sceptical and mistrusting. Furthermore it is a case of the 
amendment of a Directive: a general binding legislation and thus the value of the 
issue is important. It is also a case subject to the co-decision procedure and thus 
allows for considerable lobbying activities (Commission 2007, p. 10). Lastly a 
policy proposal was selected for which the Commission had carried out online 
consultations; otherwise it would not have been possible to find the specific 
interests of the actors involved.  
 
Working with one case study provides high internal validity and is well suited for 
generating new hypotheses and checking rival theories (Bryman 2008, p. 55). The 
level of abstraction is, however low and thus generalizability and the replicability 
of the findings is limited (Ibid.). This is because the findings create a multitude of 
hypotheses and are characterized by contradictory findings (Ibid.). It is therefore 
important to note that the aim is not to identify typical cases or to generalize, but 
to choose a case of importance, and to test it in relation to the Commission’s 
hypothesis.  
 
In the first part of my chapter on theory I deduct some resources, from Fritz 
Scharpf and Robert Keohanes theory, that could be of importance in the 
constitution of lobbyists gaining most influence. A rational-institutionalist view 
on the role of institutions is thus adopted. According to this view institutions 
matter and they decide the rules actors such as lobbyists have to follow. Pieter 
Bouwen’s theory on access goods was further used. In Bouwen’s theory the EU 
demands access goods from the lobbyists in return of influence in negotiations. 
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By using Pieter Bouwen’s theory on access goods, a deductive method was 
applied, deducing two resources of importance from his theory. Citizen support 
and economic power was found to be of importance in the constitution of 
lobbyists having more influence than others in the policy-formulation and 
decision making stages of the EU policy process. Heike Klüver also conclude 
these resources as being of substantial importance, and they become subject to 
empirical scrutiny in the analysis.  The importance of the two resources will be 
analyzed by holding these up against empirical findings in order to conclude if 
lobbyists with one specific resource exert more influence than others and thus if 
the lobbyists exerting most influence bring democratic value to the policy process.  
 
The chosen theoretical framework consists of different theories. The different 
theoretical approaches are applied in relation to democracy in the EU in order to 
answer the problem formulation. The purpose of the second part of the theoretical 
chapter was therefore to theorize on a standard for evaluating the democratic 
value of the inclusion of lobbyists in the EU policy process. Furthermore I wish to 
test and possibly develop Heike Klüver argument that the Commission is more 
interested in economic power than citizen support, since this institution is not 
directly elected. I do this by defining democratic value in relation to 
representativeness, and I argue that citizen support could also be of interest to the 
Commission. This is because representativeness and citizen support equals broad 
public acceptance and makes it easier for the Commission proposal to go through 
the EP and the Council in the co-decision procedure. In this way the theoretical 
ambition of this thesis is to use existing theory, test it and possibly develop it.  
 
The following sections will in depth describe the method for analysis. 
3.2 Coding who influences 
In order to look into possible changes between the outcome and the ideal point of 
the lobbyists involved in the EU policy-making process, the method of coding is 
used. For the coding, the policy proposal concerning better protection against 
falsified medicine and thus the amendment of Directive 2001/83/EC was chosen. 
Working with qualitative data is much more abstract than quantitative data, as 
there is no specific rule regarding how one deals with the data. Numbers can 
easily be arranged and placed into systems, whereas it is more complex with 
words and statements (Bryman 2008, p. 538). Coding indicates that data are 
broken down into component parts and it hereby links the data to our ideas (Ibid, 
p. 542). By use of coding, the content of a qualitative text is categorized in order 
to analyze systematically. This means that when a text or a statement is read, I 
label sentences of the texts that are relevant to a given proposal and systematize 
the otherwise less systematic empiric data into numbers. A label in this study will 
thus occur every time an actor is displaying an interest. Once all texts have been 
coded, they are re-read and re-coded in relation to what has been learned through 
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the first coding and, finally, the coded interests are compared. To code each time 
an interest is displayed reduce the chance of bias. In the end the coded interests 
are placed in an excel sheet, giving each proposed article, and the interests 
connected to this, a specific color in order to create an overview.  
 
As an example the pharmaceutical company Pfizer wrote that “If the use of 
tamper evident packaging by manufacturers is to be an effective security measure, 
it is obvious that medicines packs must not be opened at any point in the 
distribution chain, save by the end-user (hospital or healthcare professional or 
the patient). The current practice whereby intermediate traders open packs for re-
packaging for other markets in course of parallel trade destroys any tamper 
evident packaging and frequently other security features applied to them by the 
manufacturer”. This is a clear display of interest in relation to the ban of 
repacking proposed by the Commission in article 4.1.3 of the preliminary 
consultation draft. Consequently it is marked in turquoise, as it display an interest 
regarding article 4.1.3. In the same way, as seen in Appendix I on the following 
Compact Disc (CD), interest displayed in relation to the proposed article 4.1.4 of 
the preliminary consultation draft is coloured army green and so forth.  
 
Influence is measured in the policy formulation and decision-making stages of the 
policy process, by looking into public consultations with the Commission. 
Empirical material is used in the form of public consultation material available on 
the Commission webpage. From the policy positions from interest group 
consultation submissions, interests will be extracted by virtue of coding and 
compared with the Commission's preliminary consultation draft, the 
Commission's final policy proposal, and the final legislative act adopted by the 
Council and the EP. The thesis only studies lobbyists representing associations, 
companies and national public authorities. This is due to the fact that previous 
studies have found that associations and companies are the most active lobbying 
actors at the European level and that they contribute to the biggest groups 
participating in online consultations (Klüver 2013, p. 105). National authorities 
will be analyzed in order to look at policy positions of member states, which is of 
importance to the Council and the EP.  
 
The Commission launched a public online consultation, which ran from 11 March 
2008 and was open to anyone interested in this issue. The amendment was seen as 
highly important and the Commission received 123 contributions from 
stakeholders (COM, 2008). However only 50 submissions are analysed. This has 
been done since interests have to be displayed in relation to specific parts of the 
preliminary consultation draft in order to say which lobbyists influenced. Policy 
position submissions, which only state if the sender is for or against the whole 
proposal and which do not give any fruitful criticism have thus been excluded as 
they do not display any specific interests, furthermore individual’s submissions 
have not been considered, since I only study companies, associations and national 
associations. Lastly three submissions have been excluded due to language 
barriers in German and French. In the following section the plan of coding is 
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presented.  
3.2.1 Coding for interests 
Though Klüver has inspired this thesis, she measures influence through the 
method of word-count, but as mentioned previously in this chapter, in this thesis 
hand coding is used. This does not only allow me to find the lobbyists exerting 
most influence, but it also gives me a chance to look into what the different 
actors’ interests are. The different categories of interests are highly relevant 
determining the bargaining position of each actor. It is however important to 
consider the limitations of the chosen method, as there can be some difficulties 
with the qualitative method. Since the main intention is not to generalize on a 
basis of many respondents, the data is highly based on interpretations (Saldaña 
2013, p. 4). There is no checklist as to how one identifies the most relevant 
interests, so my personal assumptions will automatically play a role. By doing 
several rounds of coding however the chance of bias is minimized. 
 
The goal was to code for specific interests, however this is sometimes very 
difficult. This is because actors are not always either in agreement with a proposal 
or against, and it has thus been my exercise to decide what their expressions 
mean. Two examples are given below: 
 
The company Aegate wrote in response to the proposal of a Centrally accessible 
record (Part 4.1.4 of the proposed Directive) that “An obligatory approach to 
trace the movement and ownership (pedigree) of a medicinal product is an 
idealistic solution, not one that is practical in the near term.” I chose to read the 
sentence as against the proposed 4.1.4. However, it is not clear here and directly 
stated that they are directly negative towards the proposal, and on one hand they 
state that it is an “idealistic solution” however on the other hand they state that it 
is “not practical”. Here as a scholar, I had to make my own clear distinction of 
what I describe as being against the specific part of the directive. As a coding is 
never black and white, a specific evaluation criterion had to be developed for 
being mostly pro or against part 4.1.1. of the Directive. In this line of thought 
even though Aegate think that it is an idealistic solution, they are against a 
proposal according to its practicality. If Aegate did not value economic 
consideration as related to practicality and effectiveness above patient safety 
measures, they would have been positive towards an extra measure. Another 
example of the difficulties of coding is given below:  
 
The Association of the European Self-Medication Industry (AESGP) wrote in 
response to the proposal of a Centrally accessible record (category 4. Part 4.1.4 of 
the proposed Directive) that “Although AESGP does not deny the value of such a 
proposal in theory, it is not immediately clear how the implementation of such a 
system would work in practice”. AESGP does not clearly state whether they are 
positive or negative towards the proposal, and thus they were marked as neutral.  
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This shows it can be hard sometimes to judge what category the lobbyists should 
be subjected to. Other scholars might have read the statements differently, but as 
mentioned I coded the submissions several times and always subjected lobbyists 
to neutral when in doubt or when contrasting statements were displayed. 
Furthermore to avoid personal bias of interpretation Celia Stenderup, another 
scholar was asked to reread and reinterpret whether the interests displayed were 
pro, neutral or against the proposed articles. Where disagreement between her and 
I appeared, Celia’s interpretation was always favored.  
3.2.2 Operationalization 
In the analysis the most debated parts of the Directive is brought up for analytical 
review. These are article 4.1.1, 4.1.3, 4.1.4 and article 4.1.5. 
 
The position of the Commission in the consultation draft, the policy proposal and 
the final legislative act adopted by the EP and the Council are compared in order 
to say something about the change in opinion before and after consultation with 
the lobbyists and lastly the change after consultation with the EP and the Council. 
This is done in order to say something about the actors who align the most with 
the policy proposal and thus have influenced the Commission the most, and the 
actors who align the most with the final legislative act and thus have influenced 
the EP and the Council the most.  However, to grasp the full picture of the 
winning actors, and relate this to the question of democratic representation, the 
different constitutions of the winning lobbyists will be studied as well.  
 
In order to evaluate what constitutes the lobbyists exerting most influence in terms 
of resources, the findings from the coding will be held up against the theoretically 
deduced standard of democratic value, and the resources of importance to the 
institutions. Heike Klüver found that citizen support; economic resources and 
policy-relevant information are three crucial resources for the level of influence of 
lobbyists in the policy process of co-decision. It is however argued in the chapter 
on theory, that both economic resources and citizen support represent specific 
policy-relevant information in their own right, and the levels of these factors are 
thus what is aimed at looking into within the lobbyists exerting most influence.  
 
In order to understand the lobbying success it is necessary to look at the 
aggregated citizen support and economic power of the group of lobbyist exerting 
most influence (Klüver 2014, p. 56). As mentioned in the chapter on theory, the 
EU institutions are subject to a wide variety of lobbyist who seeks influence in the 
policy process. The institutions are most likely to trade influence for resources 
with the lobbyists who are members of the strongest coalition, since the strongest 
coalition can supply them with substantial amount of resources (Ibid). What 
matters thus becomes the strength of the coalitions that share the same policy 
goal. These coalitions are not official, however they will be treated as groups 
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throughout the analysis, because they share the same interests. 
 
It will be analysed if it is associations as opposed to companies that win in terms 
of influence. This relates to the concept of representativeness and equality since 
citizen representation associations have citizen support, while companies have 
economic power and less citizen support. Furthermore in associations, small 
companies have a chance to form coalitions in order to influence and this is 
related to the deduced standard of equality.  It will therefore also be analysed if it 
is the big companies as opposed to the small companies that win in terms of 
exerting most influence.  
 
As already discussed in the theoretical chapter, lobbyists can represent different 
sets of interests depending on the type of lobby or interest organisation 
considered. Citizen representation associations such as the International 
Trademark Association represents the interests of the consumers and hence the 
citizens. Their representation is thus based on achieving an outcome satisfactory 
to their members and their target groups, since these associations justify their role 
in the policy process by virtue of this exact representation of interests. As such, 
they translate the wants and needs of the broader, unorganized citizenry into 
single contact points and trade-in the information sorely needed to the 
Commission. The Commission needs this information to obtain public buy in via 
citizen support. 
 
Companies on the other hand are profit-maximisers, indicating their interests will 
ultimately stem from their self-interest in economic development. This interest 
can be both regulatory or de-regulatory as some companies might benefit 
economically from stricter rules matching their existing internal procedures and 
hence equalling out the competition (e.g. companies already following a stricter 
packaging standard) while others might support less regulation to limit their costs. 
Both interests, though divergent, are founded in profit-maximisation logics and 
hence on representing the interest of the company only. It is important to note that 
the distinction between associations and companies might be simplistic, yet based 
on theory. 
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4 Case Introduction and Analysis 
In the first part of this chapter, I explain why it is hard to predict what the 
outcome of my analysis will be, because of the paradox that lobbyists representing 
big pharmaceutical companies have substantial power, but that this power at the 
same time is very restricted. I will further introduce the case investigated and 
describe the amendments proposed by the Commission. In the second part of the 
chapter, I will begin my analysis of the empirical data gathered. First I conclude 
on the most debated aspects of the case in order to narrow the scope of the 
analysis. Hereafter I turn to the normative standard of representativeness in 
relation to equality deduced from the theoretical chapter. Having this in mind, an 
analysis of the resources of the lobbyists exerting most influence will be made. 
This shows what lobbyists the institutions are mostly interested in trading 
resources for access with and will help me answer the problem formulation:  To 
what extent do lobbyists bring democratic value to the EU policy process in the 
policy formulation and decision making stages?   
4.1 The power of Big Pharma 
 In relation to theory of rational-choice, the pharmaceutical companies want to 
gain something from their interaction with the EU institutions. As companies 
produce goods and services, they trade in order to make profits; the main resource 
providers for companies are thus the customers who buy their goods and services.  
Customers and high profits, just like in any other company, ensure the survival of 
the pharmaceutical industry, but the pharmaceutical companies are a special case 
(Edgar 2013, p. 295). This is because of four reasons: First, they face a higher 
degree of regulation than other businesses. Medicine is potentially dangerous if 
misused and thus they require extensive regulation, intended to protect the 
consumer and general public (Ibid). Second, pharmaceutical companies are often 
prohibited from selling many of their most significant products directly to the 
consumer. I.e. the consumers are given access to the medicine only through 
complex systems of gatekeepers within the health service such as prescribing 
physicians working within the boundaries of national law (Ibid.). Third, and 
maybe most important, is the fact that the consumer rarely pays either directly or 
in full to the pharmaceutical companies, consumption can thus not be linked to 
any clear way of demand (willingness or ability to pay), but instead it is linked to 
the notion of “need” (Ibid.). Lastly, the legal framework for patenting entails 
companies to have exclusive rights over the production and sales of a new product 
for a very limited time (Ibid.). Despite this unusual distribution and sales process, 
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however, there are substantial profits to gain from the pharmaceutical industry. 
Because of all the restrictions and regulation surrounding the specific industry of 
pharmaceuticals one could expect a general trust among the citizens of the EU 
towards the companies. Yet, the above-mentioned features of the industry also 
indicate the bargaining power of the pharmaceutical industry.  
 
Because of the “need” for medicine instead of the classical definition of demand, 
governments as well as individuals are very dependent on the pharmaceutical 
companies and the specific medicine they produce, this is however also why there 
is substantial profit to collect in the pharmaceutical industry. Furthermore since 
pharmaceutical companies are prohibited from selling their products directly to 
the consumer, they are more prone to use lobbyism as a mean to gain profit. 
Regulations can thus be argued to demand that pharmaceutical companies 
exercise its power in a highly distinctive manner. Big pharmaceutical companies 
have to attempt to influence the perceived legitimacy of government health 
policies, through complex negotiations including physicians, media, other medical 
professionals as well as government agencies involved in determining medical 
formulary (Ibid, p. 296). But as lobbying is a costly affair, it is often only the big 
pharmaceutical companies known as Big Pharma, that engage in such activities.   
 
In a classical understanding of power and influence, it can be argued that all 
companies will exercise economic power in an attempt to shape the regulatory 
frameworks to their advantage. In this line of thought, one could expect Big 
Pharma to be against the implementation of more regulation measures in order to 
cope with falsified medicine. This is because regulation measures can be rather 
costly and because the problem is not substantial enough to them. But instead of a 
classic understanding of power, Big Pharma’s power can also be argued to include 
communication skills.  
 
Communication skills can be approached, turning to the significance of 
advertising and public affairs. As mentioned in the chapter on theory, companies’ 
interest is to survive, in order to survive they need to have customers, and thus 
they have to represent the needs of the consumers, however at the same time they 
wish to reduce costs. In relation to the case at hand The World Health 
Organization (WHO) estimates that up to 1% of medicines available in the 
developed world are likely to be counterfeit. Though it can be argued not to be a 
substantial problem, this figure increases to 10% on a global scale and it is rather 
dangerous since it regards medicine and it can be potentially dangerous to 
consume (Jones 2014). The responsibility of solving this problem lies with many 
actors, one of them is the pharmaceutical industry and it is of interest for them to 
engage in such debate since the pharmaceutical companies in recent years have 
seen their images dramatically eroded (Hogerzeil 2013, p. 899). Big Pharma’s 
public image has been damaged by aggressive patent policies that seriously 
hamper access to generic medicines for developing countries and by highly visible 
court convictions for aggressive marketing — for example, in the United States 
and China (Ibid.). Abuse of patent as in the case of AstraZeneca, and as a 
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consequence higher medicine costs have further hampered the public image of 
Big Pharma. As a reaction several of the big companies have sought guidance 
from health experts on improving both performance and public image (Ibid.). The 
European as well as the international public health community expects a 
responsible pharmaceutical industry. This means that it becomes hard to predict 
Big Pharma’s strategies, and if the companies in general are actually for or against 
further directives to cope with falsified medicine.  
 
Though the companies might have substantial economic power, they are also 
aware of their public image in relation to the consumers and the professional 
health community. This means that the inclusion of pharmaceutical company 
lobbyists can be undemocratic in terms of representativeness and a reflection of 
inequality between different societal actors. However, at the same time lobby 
influence can be of common good to the European citizens after all, and thus we 
come back to the assertion that this thesis does not aim to study whether lobbyists 
are good or bad, but simply if the inclusion of these in the policy process provides 
democratic legitimacy. The analysis will in more detail investigate the influence 
of Big Pharma lobbyists, but before this, it is necessary to introduce the case and 
the specific amendments proposed in relation to Directive 2001/83/EC. 
 
4.2 The proposed amendment of Directive 
2011/83/EC on falsified medicine 
The point of departure for the assessment of lobby influence is the preliminary 
draft proposal as it marks the beginning of the legislative process and therefore 
sets the agenda for the legislative debate (Klüver 2013, p. 156).   
 
As part of the pharmaceutical package, in December 2008, the Commission 
published a communication in which it proposed a legislative framework to 
protect the EU from falsified medicine and thus the amendment of Directive 
2001/83/EC. The Commission called for several improvements in labelling and 
handling of medicinal products displayed in a preliminary consultation draft4. 
 
Though it can be argued that all the proposed articles were of importance, the 
majority of lobbyists only brought up a handful in their policy submissions. From 
the coding of interests in the total fifty policy position submissions from lobbyists 
Diagram 4.1 on the next page was made. The graph illustrates the extent, to which 
a certain article was subject to lobbyism, i.e. the articles, which received the most 
attention. The attention received is here used as a measure for interest 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
4 The proposals are described in Appendix II on the CD. 
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concentration, i.e. the attention corresponds to the concentration of interests by the 
participants in the hearing.  It was done through a calculation of the amount of 
lobbyists out of a total of fifty, who mention directly their interest in relation to a 
specific article of the policy proposal from the Commission. The chart shows how 
the frequency of lobby interest is highest concerning four proposed articles. These 
are article 4.1.3 which suggests to improve product integrity through a unique seal 
from the manufacturer to the retailer or wholesaler, using a risk-based approach, 
supported by a ban of repacking; article 4.1.4 proposing a centrally accessible 
record to facilitate traceability of batches throughout the distribution chain; article 
4.1.5 which stipulates mass serialisation for pack-tracing and authenticity checks 
on a case-by-case basis; and finally article 4.1.1 which stipulates that all actors of 
the distribution chain should be subject to pharmaceutical legislation. These four 
articles and the interests expressed in relation will serve as subjects of analysis in 
the following sections. 
 
 
Diagram 4.1 Frequency of overall lobby interest according to specific article proposal in the 
preliminary consultation draft (N=50). 
The analysis will now turn to an analysis of the lobbyists who influenced. These 
will be analysed from the deduced standards of democratic value. 
4.3 Representativeness in relation to equality 
As argued in the chapter on theory, the Commission is concerned with the 
representativeness of those who want to be consulted in the policy process. 
Representativeness ensures broad public acceptance. Lobbyists thus have 
democratic value if they represent a balanced presence of societal interests. Large 
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companies, as well as small and medium sized companies should have equal 
chance of exerting influence in the policy process, and influence should not only 
be a consequence of economic power. 
4.3.1 The proposed ban of repacking 
As mentioned previously in the chapter on previous research and in the chapter on 
theory, Robert Dahl argues that identifying ”who prevails in decision-making 
seems the best way to determine which individuals and groups have more power 
in social life, because direct conflict between actors presents a situation most 
closely approximating an experimental test of their capacities to affect outcomes” 
(Dahl 1963 in Lukes 2005, p. 18). Conflict is thus important in relation to the 
analysis of interests of lobbyists and what kinds of lobbyists who influence. The 
conflict is substantial in some cases and minor in others, depending on the policy 
proposals discussed. Each displays a different problem, which highlights the 
interest of different actors.  
 
Regarding the proposal of a ban of repackaging referred to in the proposed article 
4.1.3 there is a clear division of specific lobby groups in favour and against the 
proposal. Diagram 4.2 below displays the percentage of national associations, 
associations and companies respectively, which are pro, against or neutral towards 
the proposal. What is interesting is that mostly lobbyists representing companies 
were pro the proposal (80%) and none of them were against, however several 
associations (31%) as well as national associations (57%) were against such 
proposal and expressed substantial concern regarding the proposal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 4.2 Percentage of National Associations (N=7), Associations (N=17) and Companies 
(N=15) in favour, neutral or against a ban of repacking, as proposed in article 4.1.3 of the preliminary 
consultation draft. 
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The proposed ban of repacking is of special importance to parallel traders. Parallel 
imports are genuine goods produced under the protection of intellectual property 
rights (IPR), sold into one market, and then brought legally into another market 
without the authorization of the local IPR owner (Bicen 2014, p. 25). Throughout 
the EU a product might be sold at one price in one member state and at another 
cheaper price in another member state. This makes it attractive for wholesalers, 
and thus they buy products in one member state, import it into another and sell the 
products at a lower price. However parallel imports also take place between the 
EU and third countries and they can also take place regarding products that have 
not yet been introduced in, and imported to, a given country by the IPR owner.  
 
Parallel import directly results in substantial losses to companies (Ibid). As an 
example the parallel import of pharmaceuticals was valued at one billion Euros in 
the United Kingdom alone (Ibid). While parallel trade has negatively impacted 
manufacturers, proponents of parallel trade highlight the beneficial effects for the 
end consumers in that the goods become accessible at inexpensive prices (Ibid). In 
this way especially the proposed ban of repacking in article 4.1.3 of the 
Commission preliminary consultation draft becomes important, since repacking is 
vital for parallel importers, who have to repack the pharmaceuticals imported into 
a new country according to the new country’s specific safety feature requirements. 
The parallel importers are thus against the proposed measure to ban repacking. In 
other words, being in favor or against the ban of repacking represents divergent 
interests since parallel import have negative impact on the profit of companies. 
However, at the same time it is good for the citizens and consumers represented 
by associations, since parallel imported medicinal products are cheaper and thus 
more available to a broad array of citizens.  
 
In the legislative proposal, the Commission retained its proposal with minor, 
though very important changes. In Article 1(9.2) it is directly stated that “The 
safety features referred to in point (o) of Article 54 shall not be partly or fully 
removed or covered-up, unless the following conditions are fulfilled”. One of 
these conditions is that “The manufacturing authorisation holder complies with 
point (o) of Article 54 by replacing the safety feature (…) without opening the 
immediate packaging as defined in Art 1(23).”(COMb 2008, p. 12). The 
immediate packaging defined in Art 1(23) of the previous Directive refers to the 
container or other form of packaging immediately in contact with the medicinal 
product. This definition is highly important, since it is only the outer packaging 
that is necessary for parallel importers to remove. 
 
Since it was only associations and national associations that were against the 
proposal, it can be concluded that the associations and national associations 
against the proposed article 4.1.3 must have influenced the Commission the most 
in this case. This is further highlighted by the fact that the Commission from the 
beginning introduced the ban of repacking itself. In relation to theory this means 
that the lobbyists against the proposal got the Commission not to do something 
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they otherwise would have done. No consideration, however, was given to the 
interests of individual companies.  
 
The associations exerting most influence in the case of article 4.1.3 were: 
Associations of European Self-Medication Industry (AESGP), European 
Association of Euro-Pharmaceutical Companies (EAEPC), and International 
Trademark Association (INTA). AESGP is the official representation of 
manufacturers of non-prescription medicines, food supplements and self-care 
medical devices in Europe. It represents more than 2000 companies operating in 
the consumer healthcare sector in Europe, affiliated with AESGP directly or 
indirectly through the national associations. The AESGP further includes main 
multinational companies as well as the European small and medium-sized 
enterprises of the sector (AESG 2015). The second association is EAEPC, who’s 
objective is to: safeguard the free movement of medicines, as laid down in Article 
28 EC, and to counteract any attempts to restrict the freedom of choice for the 
consumer through trading patterns in breach of Articles 81 EC Treaty & 82 EC 
Treaty. Furthermore it represents 70 firms in the parallel import industry from 16 
countries (EAEPC 2015). Lastly INTA is a global association of trademark 
owners and professionals dedicated to supporting trademarks and related 
intellectual property in order to protect consumers and to promote fair and 
effective commerce (INTA 2015).  What these associations have in common is 
that they all reflect the interests of a broad array of societal actors, including 
small, medium-sized and big companies as well as consumers and individuals. 
This, however, also means that though individual companies did not directly gain 
influence regarding the proposed article 4.1.3, they could have done so through 
associations. Nevertheless since the article touch upon issues of parallel import, 
important to smaller and medium sized companies doing parallel importation, but 
very undesirable to big companies, the Commission, in this case, could be argued 
to favour actors with broad societal citizen support as opposed to economic 
power. 
 
Regarding the proposal 4.1.3 and a ban of repackaging, there was further 
distinction between interests of actors with substantial economic power as 
opposed to actors with less. This division was between national associations from 
big member states as opposed to others national associations from smaller 
member states. To bring matters to the head, Malta Chamber of small and medium 
sized companies especially expressed its concern regarding article 4.1.3 and 
wrote: “The only entity to benefit from this is what is generally known as the Big 
Pharma Lobby. Despite its many legal losses over these last 30 years, where it 
has lost every case in the European Court of Justice challenging Parallel 
Distribution, this lobby will persist in finding new ways and suborning new 
entities to its will in its never ending quest to stop Parallel Distribution. We are 
saddened that of all entities, the Commission, which is the bastion of all that is the 
EU, has lent its attention to this lobby’s entreaties.”(GRTU 2008 p. 5). The Polish 
Association of parallel importers of Medicinal products emphasised the same 
problem and stated “Parallel import is an activity that is regulated by law, 
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legitimate and subject to full control. As emphasised by Zofia Ulz, it is unfair to 
give an impression as though this were not the case.”(SIRPL 2008, p. 3).  What 
these associations have in common is that they are both from smaller member 
states with less economic power than big countries, and thus they rely on the 
cheaper provided pharmaceutical imports from parallel trading. On the other hand, 
National associations from bigger countries such as The German association 
Verband forschender Arzneimittelherstell argued in favour of the ban of repacking 
and stated that: “Product integrity should be strengthened by obliging 
manufacturers to seal packs and traders/pharmacies to sell product only with 
which the manufacturer’s sealing remains intact; this combined obligation for 
both partners in the supply chain is crucial. Additional leaflets, labels etc., if 
necessary, could be taped onto the original intact box.” (VFA 2008, p. 2).  
 
The Commission thus favoured the associations against the proposal, as well as 
the national associations from smaller member states. This shows that it is not 
only the lobbyists from big companies or countries with substantial economic 
power that always influence, and thus regarding the proposed article 4.1.3 the 
lobbyists exerting most influence had democratic value in terms of different 
societal actors having equal chance of exerting influence. 
4.3.2 The proposed centrally accessible record 
In relation to the proposed article 4.1.4 suggesting a centrally accessible record to 
facilitate traceability of batches throughout the distribution chain, Diagram 4.3 
below show that the majority of both companies (50%) and national associations 
(75%) were in favour of such proposal. What is interesting is that only the 
majority of associations (38%) were against a centrally accessible record. It is, 
however, important to state that no actors were against the general idea of 
traceability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 4.3 Per cent of national associations (N=4), Associations (N=13) and Companies (N=14) 
in favour, neutral or against a centrally accessible record, as proposed in article 4.1.4 of the 
preliminary consultation draft. 
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In the policy proposal, the Commission included a point referred to in 4.1.4 of the 
preliminary consultation draft. However where the previous article proposed a 
centrally accessible record to facilitate traceability of batches throughout the 
distribution chain, the policy proposal leave out the centrally accessible record 
and only propose that the holders of distribution authorization “(…) must keep 
records either in the form of purchase/sales invoices or on computer, or in any 
other form, giving for any transaction in medicinal products received, dispatched 
or traded (…)” (COMb 2008, p. 13). The outcome was thus in the interest of the 
lobbyists that were against the idea of a centrally accessibly record as proposed in 
article 4.1.4.  
 
Since most companies were in favour of the proposal and most associations were 
against, it can be concluded that the Commission favoured the interests of the 
majority of associations. Since associations represent several individuals and 
several companies, the associations can be argued to have citizen support as 
opposed to individual companies, only having economic power, this support the 
representativeness of the lobbyists exerting most influence.  The Commission thus 
favoured trading influence for citizen support in relation to the proposed article 
4.1.4.  
 
In case of the proposed article 4.1.4, one could, however, assume a division of 
interests between small and medium sized companies. This is because traceability 
features such as pedigree and machines to read a batch can be rather costly. 
Smaller companies might not have the necessary funds to implement the proposed 
measures. However as seen in table 4.1 below, no pattern exists between big firms 
with substantial economic power in favour of the proposal, as opposed to small 
and medium sized companies against. What is interesting in the table is that the 
division is quite diffuse, most big companies with annual revenue above one 
billion are in favour of the proposal, however the biggest company Johnson & 
Johnson is against it, as well as the smallest company Sanofi Aventis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The majority of associations however, as mentioned, were against the proposal of 
a centrally accessible record. Such associations represent small, medium sized and 
big companies, as well as pharmacists and community pharmacists. It can thus be 
argued that the Commission favoured the interests of the majority of associations 
Companies 
against Annual revenue 2014  Companies in favour 
Annual revenue 
2014 
Amgen Inc.  16,6 bio  € *2013 Bristol Meyers Squibb 14,9 bio € 
Johnson & 
Johnson 69,7 bio € First Odemand Ltd - 
Sanofi Aventis 33,7 mio € Novartis 51,6 bio € 
  
Pfizer 46 bio € 
  
Aegate - 
  
Reckitt Beckiser 14 bio €  
  
Roche 45,7 bio € 
Table 4.1 Annual revenue of the companies in favour and against the proposed article 4.1.4 
regarding a centrally accessible record 
  34 
having citizen support, however not the majority of companies with substantial 
economic power.  
 
The chance of exerting influence in the policy process by different societal 
interests has thus proven rather equal in the cases looked into in this section, 
because an association represent these and because the associations have a chance 
to gain influence. 
4.3.3 The proposed mass-serialisation feature 
Article 4.1.5 suggested the possibility to trace each pack and perform authenticity 
checks, attained by a mass serialisation feature on the outer packaging. As seen in 
Diagram 4.4. below, 80 % of the national associations, 67 % of associations and 
64 % of the companies were in favour of this. What is interesting in the table is 
thus that the vast majority of lobbyists in all the three groupings were in favour of 
such suggestion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the proposed legislation for the EP and the Council, the Commission respected 
the majority. Though not specifically referring to a mass-serialisation system it is 
stipulated that:  In Article 54, the following point (o) is added”. (o) Refers to 
“safety features making it possible to ascertain identification, authenticity and 
traceability of medicinal products (…)”(COMb 2008, p. 14).  Article 54 in the 
amended directive refers to specific particulars that shall appear on the outer 
packaging of medicinal products. The Commission thus respected the interest of 
the majority in terms of verifying authenticity. Since the lobbyists exerting most 
influence regarding the proposed article 4.1.5 were the majority of both national 
associations, associations and companies, together they constitute 
Diagram 4.4 Per cent of national associations (N=5), Associations (N=12) and Companies (N=14) 
in favour, neutral or against a centrally the proposed mass-serialisation feature, as proposed in 
article 4.1.5 of the preliminary consultation draft. 
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representativeness.  
4.3.4 The proposal to subject all actors of the distribution chain to 
pharmaceutical legislation 
In relation to the proposed article 4.1.1, and thus to subject all actors of the 
distribution chain to pharmaceutical legislation, the overall majority of the 
lobbyists representing different interests were also in favour of the proposal 
except for the national associations who split fifty-fifty between neutral and in 
favour. Diagram 4.4 below display how 71 % of companies, 75 % of the 
associations and 50 % of the national associations were in favour of the proposal. 
What again becomes interesting to notice is that the vast majority of both 
companies and associations were in favour. 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Commission respected the interests of the majority and in the final policy 
proposal it stated that “In order to ensure reliability in the distribution chain, 
pharmaceutical legislation should address all actors in the distribution chain: this 
includes not only distributors who procure, hold, store, and supply products, but 
also persons who are involved in transactions without handling the products” 
(COMb 2008, p. 18).   
 
It can thus be concluded that the Commission followed the interests of the vast 
majority of lobbyists representing different lobby groups in relation to the 
proposed article 4.1.1. This was also the case in relation to the proposed article 
4.1.5. The result thus means that since the lobbyists exerting most influence 
regarding the proposed article 4.1.1 were the majority of both associations and 
companies, together they constitute representativeness. 
Diagram 4.5 Per cent of national associations (N=4), Associations (N=12) and Companies (N=14) 
in favour, neutral or against the proposal to subject all actors of the distribution chain to 
pharmaceutical legislation, as proposed in article 4.1.1 of the preliminary consultation draft. 
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4.4 Democracy as an institutional arrangement 
In this thesis democracy is defined as an institutional arrangement. It is therefore 
the institutions, i.e. the EP, the Council and the Commission, which shape the 
outcome of the policy process, also in terms of how democratic the outcome 
might be.  This is because institutions decide who gets influence in the policy 
process and what resources they are willing to trade this influence for.  
 
In the chapter on theory, Heike Klüver argued that both the Commission, the 
Council and the EP demand economic power from lobby groups in return of 
influence. If this was fact, it would mean that the lobbyists allowed to influence 
by the Commission would not bring democratic value to the EU policy process, 
since this would effect in only allowing lobby coalitions with economic power, to 
exert influence in the process. On the other hand I argued in the theoretical 
chapter, that the Commission could also have interest in citizen support, since it is 
also interested in the representativeness of the lobbyists exerting influence in the 
policy process. The latter turned out to be true in relation to the Commission and 
some of the amendments investigated. In relation to the proposed article 4.1.4, 
citizen support was favoured more than economic power, since the outcome was 
in the interest of the majority of associations, however not in the interest of the 
majority of companies. Citizen support was thus favoured more by the 
Commission than economic power, since only individual companies have 
substantial economic power, and because associations have citizen support. In 
relation to the proposed article 4.1.3, the interests of the individual companies was 
again not valued by the Commission, this has positive impact on the equality of a 
chance of different interest to exert influence, since the outcome was in favour of 
only associations and national associations.   
 
In relation to article 4.15 and 4.1.1, though not directly favouring either lobbyists 
with citizen support or economic power in the final legislative proposal, it can be 
concluded that the Commission followed the interests of the vast majority of 
lobbyists representing many different lobby groups both associations and 
companies. The outcome of negotiations with the Commission was thus in favour 
of the majority of each of the different lobby groups and the lobbyists exerting 
most influence was thus representative.  
4.4.1 The final legislative act 
With its monopoly of legislative initiative the Commission has an important 
agenda-setting function: It decides the terms and conditions of any legislative 
debate because it is the role of Commission to design the content of a legislative 
proposal on which basis the other institutions bargain about the final legislative 
act (Klüver 2013, p. 156). This is essential since the lobbyists have to take into 
account the proposal just like the Commission has presented it; the Commission 
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premise is therefore starting point, no matter size and power of the lobbyists. 
Nevertheless it always has to be approved by the Council and the EP. The 
Commission adopted its legislative proposal in December 2008 and forwarded it 
to the Council and the EP, for legislative discussion under the Co-decision 
procedure and the decision-making stage of the policy process (COM, 2008). 
Interest groups enjoy multiple access points during the decision-making stage. 
They can establish informal and formal contacts with the Council, the EP, and the 
Commission to shape the final legislative act. The final legislative act can thus be 
seen as a result of the interests from lobbyists important for the EP and the 
Council to trade resources for access with. The Council and the EP approved the 
final legislative act after the first reading in February 2011 (EP 2011). The 
institutions made minor changes and the amendment was adopted with 569 votes 
in favour, 12 against and 7 abstentions (Ibid).  The changes are analysed in the 
following section. 
 
In relation to the proposed article 4.1.3 the text in the final legislative act was the 
same as the one proposed by the Commission. It was stipulated that “In order for 
the safety features to be effective, a manufacturing authorisation holder who is 
not himself the original manufacturer of the medicinal product should only be 
permitted to remove, replace or cover those safety features under strict 
conditions” (Directive 2011/62/EU (12)). Furthermore a ban of opening the 
immediate packaging was stressed in article 47(b) (Directive 2011/62/EU).  
However, not a ban of the outer packaging as the parallel traders had feared. The 
Council and the EP, just like the Commission did thus not favour the lobbyist with 
economic power in relation to article 4.1.3. In relation to the Council and the EP it 
is interesting that five national associations were against the proposition, which 
was the majority of the national associations displaying their interests on this 
matter in total. This of course could also have influenced the EP and Council, as 
the members of these institutions are directly elected on national and 
supranational levels. However, in relation to the proposed article 4.1.3, just like 
the Commission, the interests of the individual companies was not valued by the 
EP and the Council. This have positive impact on the equality of a chance of 
different interest to influence, since the outcome was in favour of only 
associations and national associations, but no individual companies. 
 
The proposed article 4.1.4, however was adopted to a larger degree in the final 
legislative act than it had been in the policy proposal. In the final legislative act 
something close to a centrally accessible record was proposed, however only 
described indirectly as safety features that should allow “verification of the 
authenticity and identification of individual packs, and provide evidence of 
tampering” (Directive 2011/62/EU (11)). Furthermore it is stated that: “Safety 
features for medicinal products should be harmonised within the Union in order 
to take account of new risk profiles (…)” (Ibid). And that “The unique identifier 
as well as corresponding repositories (….) might include commercially sensitive 
information”(Ibid). To include a notion of a centrally accessible record was 
different from the final policy proposal by the Commission. Instead of favouring 
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the 38 % of associations against, what is interesting is that 50 % of companies and 
especially the majority of national associations (75%) were in favour. The Council 
and EP thus favoured the citizen support from the member states, and the 
economic power of companies, however it would be interesting to see whether the 
majority of companies would have been favoured, if they did not align with the 
interests of the national associations.  The lobbyists exerting most influence thus 
had representativeness, as these were the majority of national associations. This 
also reflects that both lobby actors with substantial economic power, as well as 
lobby actors with less economic power had a chance of exerting influence, since 
lobbyists from small companies would have a chance of exerting influence 
through the national associations of their member states of origin.  
 
The proposed article 4.1.1 was adopted in the final legislative act in the same way 
as it had been in the policy proposal by the Commission. It stipulates: “Persons 
procuring, holding, storing, supplying or exporting medicinal products are only 
entitled to pursue their activities if they meet the requirements for obtaining 
wholesale distribution authorisation”. (Directive 2011/62/EU (6)). This is in line 
the proposed article 4.1.1. And thus the Council and the EP also favoured the 
majority of all the lobbyists.   
 
The interests of the majority of both associations, national associations and 
companies was also respected in relation to the proposed article 4.1.5 and the 
possibility to trace each pack and perform authenticity checks, attained by a mass 
serialisation feature on the outer packaging. This was covered in Article 54 and 
the point (o) added, referring to “a device allowing verification of whether the 
outer packaging has been tampered with”.  Though one cannot conclude anything 
about what resources the EP and the Council favoured, it does tell us that the 
lobbyists exerting most influence regarding both 4.15 and 4.1.1 had 
representativeness, since both the majority of associations, national associations 
and companies was respected in the final legislative act. Furthermore different 
lobbyists all had equal chance of exerting influence, since associations allow for 
both big and small lobby actors to influence. 
4.5 Conclusion to analysis 
In the first part of this chapter, I started out stressing that it was hard to predict the 
strategy of companies in relation to the chosen case. A realist would argue that big 
pharmaceutical companies are the ones who always influence the most in 
negotiations because of their exceptional power. The concept of power in the case 
of pharmaceutical companies is however restricted, because they rely on public 
opinion of their consumers.  
 
Hereafter, from the policy positions submission and the coding, four articles was 
pointed out as being especially important to the lobbyists in relation to the 
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preliminary consultation draft made by the Commission.  These were article 4.1.3 
proposing a the ban of repacking, article 4.1.4 proposing a centrally accessible 
database, article 4.14 proposing a feature of mass-serialisation, and lastly article 
4.1.4, proposing to subject all actors of the distribution chain to pharmaceutical 
legislation.  
 
An analysis of the actors exerting most influence made by a clear distinction of 
the interests of associations, national associations and companies followed. 
Concerning article 4.1.3, the outcome in the final proposal by the Commission 
was that the lobbyists against the proposal were favoured. Since no companies 
were against the proposal, none of the interests from lobbyists representing big 
individual companies were favoured. This means that the Commission favoured 
the citizen support of the associations and national associations against the 
proposal, but not the economic power of individual companies. Furthermore 
article 4.1.3 proposed measures seriously hampering small and medium sized 
parallel importation companies however was in the interests of big companies 
wanting to stop parallel import, since parallel import decreases the profit of big 
companies. The outcome was therefore neither in the interest of the economic 
power of the majority of associations representing big companies. The majority of 
interests of national associations and 31 % of the associations however was 
respected. This display equal chance of different actors to influence, since small 
companies, as well as big, and individuals would have had a chance to influence 
through the associations.  
 
In regards to article 4.1.4 the majority of associations were against a centrally 
accessible record. The Commission did not propose a centrally accessible record 
and thus the outcome of negotiations in the final policy proposal was in favour of 
the majority of associations. The lobbyists from associations, exerting most 
influence thus had representativeness, since associations represent several 
individuals and several companies. Furthermore the lobbyists exerting most 
influence also displayed equality of the chance of different actors to exert most 
influence, since as mentioned small companies, as well as big companies and 
individuals can influence through associations. The Commission thus favoured the 
citizen support of associations as opposed to the economic power of companies 
concerning the proposed article 4.1.4.  
 
In relation to the proposed article 5.1.5 on mass serialisation and 4.1.4, both the 
majority of associations, companies and half of the national associations were in 
favour, and thus the lobbyists exerting most influence had representativeness. 
Furthermore the lobbyists exerting most influence also represented equality in 
relation to a fair chance of all the different lobby actors, to gain influence when 
joining coalition with an association.  
 
Lastly it was concluded that there were no substantial changes in the final 
legislative act as opposed to the proposal by the Commission, this suggests that 
the three institutions favoured the same kinds of resources, lobbyists and interests. 
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However where association’s citizen support could be argued to be of importance 
to all three institutions, especially the importance of the interests of national 
associations could be argued to be of importance to the Council and the EP, since 
these institutions favoured the national associations as opposed to the associations 
concerning the proposed article 4.1.5.  
 
The lobbyists exerting most influence were thus the ones representing 
associations. Since citizen representation associations represent the interests of the 
consumers and hence the citizens, they translate the wants and needs of the 
unorganized citizenry into single contact points, trading information needed by 
the EU institutions via citizen support. For the EP and the Council, citizen support 
represents a substantial number of voter-positions necessary for re-elections. In 
relation to the Commission citizen support relates to the representativeness of the 
lobbyists since citizen support equals broad public acceptance and makes it easier 
for the proposal to go through the EP and the Council in the co-decision 
procedure. The EU institutions thus favoured the lobbyists with citizen support, as 
opposed to the lobbyists with substantial economic power.  
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5 Conclusion 
On the basis of the Commission white paper on governance, this thesis aimed to 
prove or disprove if ‘better involvement’ of civil society such as lobbyists creates 
efficient and democratic governance.  
 
With rational institutionalism as a foundation, including Pieter Bouwen’s theory 
on access goods and Heike Klüver’s theory on EU institutions and interest groups, 
I created a method in order to evaluate the democratic value of lobby influence in 
the policy formulation and the decision- making stages of the EU policy process. 
In relation to democratic value I concluded that the Commission is concerned with 
the representativeness of the lobbyists who want to be consulted. Political 
representativeness ensures that input from the lobbyists into the political system is 
sufficiently representative of the political community. The most important 
objective of representativeness is to ensure broad public acceptance, and as a 
result effectiveness of the policy of democratic institutions. However, the 
democratic added value also differs in relation to an overall balanced presence of 
societal interests. The necessity of a balanced presence of societal interests means 
that the lobbyists exerting most influence are not representative if influence is 
biased in favour of some lobbyists with substantial economic power as opposed to 
lobbyists with citizen support. This definition of having representativeness 
allowed me to evaluate on the democratic value of lobbyists.  
 
Furthermore, I have attempted to create knowledge as well as understand who the 
lobbyists exerting most influence were. The knowledge arrived from the methods 
of preference attainment and my coding and the understanding was created 
through my interpretation of the outcome based on the theoretical framework. It is 
on the basis of my choices of theory and method that I answer my research 
question: To what extent do lobbyists bring democratic value to the EU policy 
process in the policy formulation and decision making stages?   
 
Defining lobbyists in the three different groupings of national associations, 
associations and companies allowed me to conclude whether the lobbyists 
exerting most influence had citizen support or economic power.  In most cases the 
outcome was in favour of associations, and thus associations influenced the most. 
Citizen representation associations represent the interests of the consumers and 
hence the citizens. Their representation is based on achieving an outcome 
satisfactory to their members and their target groups, since these associations 
justify their role in the policy process by virtue of this exact representation of 
interests. Companies on the other hand are profit-maximisers, their interests 
ultimately stem from their self-interest in economic development. Since the 
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lobbyists who exerted most influence were associations in part of the policy 
proposal where there was substantial conflict, I argue that both the EP, the 
Council and the Commission were willing to trade influence for the resource of 
citizen support. I thus conclude that lobbyists in general add substantial 
democratic value to the EU policy process. It is here important to note that the 
mere inclusion of lobbyists in the policy process does not by itself amount to 
democratic value; it is, however, the EU institutions that facilitate the frame by 
which the possible democratic value of lobbyists can or cannot unfold. In the 
presented case the EU institutions demanded citizen support from the lobbyists 
seeking influence. Lobbyists having citizen support translate the needs of the 
broader unorganized citizenry, and trade-in the information sorely needed to the 
EU institutions. The institutions need this in order to obtain public buy via citizen 
support. In this way the EU institutions restricted the influence of lobbyists, so 
that the lobbyists had to have representativeness in order gain influence. The EU 
institutions in other words facilitated the right frame, so that the potential 
democratic value of lobby influence could unfold. As such, the Commission 
proposal was consistent with reality from the very beginning, in that involvement 
of lobbyists can have a positive effect on democratic governance, as a mean to 
compensate for an otherwise representational deficit. However, it is the 
institutional settings, i.e. the needs of the Commission, EP and the Council, that 
decide if the lobbyists’ potential democratic value will be used.  
 
Moreover, I wanted to test and possibly develop the argument by Klüver (2013) 
that the Commission is more interested in economic power than citizen support, 
since this institution is not directly elected. I did this by defining democratic value 
in relation to representativeness, and argued that citizen support could also be of 
interest to the Commission, since representativeness and citizen support equals 
broad public acceptance and makes it easier for the Commission proposal to go 
through the EP and the Council in the co-decision procedure. Nevertheless I 
expected that companies, because of their substantial economic power, had a 
possibility to fast-track their influence without proving representativeness. It thus 
came as a big surprise to me that my analysis showed that the lobbyists who 
exerted most influence in the chosen case were actually associations. Because it 
was associations and not the individual companies who gained influence, it can be 
concluded that the lobbyists who exerted most influence in the case brought 
democratic value to the EU policy process, since associations represent a broad 
array of citizens’ interests. Furthermore it can be concluded that the lobbyists 
exerting most influence in the case to a very large extent brought democratic 
value to the policy process, since associations and their citizen support were 
favoured in both the policy formulation stage by the Commission and in the 
decision making stages by the EP and the Council.  
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6 Reflections 
The following reflections should be seen as having two purposes. The first section 
provides critical reflection regarding application of this thesis’ findings, the 
second part ignore the limitations of the thesis and provide possible further 
research approaches and alternative perspectives. 
 
6.1 Critical reflection 
While previous studies have largely provided a static view focusing either on the 
entire policy‐making process or on just one stage of the policy cycle, this thesis 
compares interest group influence at different stages of the policy‐making process. 
I decided to build this thesis around the policy formulation and decision making 
stages of the policy process, because these stages allow for comparison in relation 
to the method of preference attainment.  Furthermore it was chosen because 
especially the policy formulation stage, has been argued by several to be the stage 
whereat lobbyists have the best chance of exerting influence (Klüver 2013, p. 
156). I am however aware of the fact that had other stages of the policy process 
been taken into consideration, the outcome might have been different and 
arguably broader. Nevertheless looking into only the policy formulation and 
decision making stages, allows for a deeper, and arguably more thorough 
comparative analysis instead of a superficial analysis of more stages of the policy 
process. Furthermore I am aware that had another case regarding another policy 
area been chosen the outcome might also have been different. Nevertheless 
pharmaceutical policy served as an excellent case when investigating the 
influence of lobbyists, since the pharmaceutical industry are so criticized by the 
public, and because this industry make use of a substantial amount of lobbyists. 
 
I am further aware that there are other channels for exerting influence in the 
policy-making process than through public consultation, however most lobbyists 
who try to influence the policy outcome should be covered by the analysis. This is 
because consultations constitute the easiest form of access. Furthermore other 
empirical research has shown that many diverse actors indeed participate in online 
consultation e.g. associations, NGO’s and individual companies (Klüver 2013, p. 
95). 
 
As the analysis is based around the chosen theoretical deducted standard and 
resources, it is important to note which delimitations this might have. Whether the 
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EU is democratic or not depends on a lot of different variables. In this thesis I 
look at a handful, which I have deducted from the chosen theories, meaning the 
conclusion to the problem formulation is directly tied to the theoretical choices 
made. Only some aspects of democracy are researched, but I believe this is 
sufficient for the thesis, as it would be impossible to grasp every aspect within the 
page limit. However, while it is still possible to draw conclusions concerning the 
democratic value of lobbyists in the EU policy process it is essential to consider 
that the conclusion is based on the deducted standard of democratic value and the 
two resources. As these are deducted from some of the main theorists on the field 
of democracy and institutional theory, it is argued that they are significant and can 
answer the problem formulation albeit recognizing that generalization can be 
difficult, granted the conclusion is interlinked with the chosen variables. 
Furthermore, the result might have been different if other groupings of actors 
were chosen. However, as this thesis specifically looks at citizen support as a 
valuable and important asset of lobby groups in relation to their democratic value, 
the specific division of associations and companies supported the aim of analysis. 
What could be problematic are associations who also represent companies, as 
these could deceive the researcher into thinking that they represent citizens but in 
reality they only represent companies. Nevertheless the proposed article 4.1.3 and 
a ban of repacking, served proof that this was not the case of the associations 
exerting most influence, since the proposal was in direct conflict with the interests 
of big companies, as opposed to small companies using parallel import, and the 
citizens who gain cheaper medicinal products from parallel import.  
 
While the replicability of the findings in this thesis might be limited due to the 
specific codings made, the replicability of the method and theoretical claim is 
what is brought to the study of lobbyists. It can be used in any other case, wanting 
to evaluate influence by lobbyists in the EU. 
 
6.2 Further research 
For the purpose of looking into the democratic value of lobby influence in the EU 
policy process and on the basis of the findings and conclusion in this thesis, it 
would be interesting to see if the same pattern of influence and resources is to be 
found regarding other policy areas. Furthermore it would be interesting to look 
into the agenda-setting stage and the implementation stage of the policy process as 
well. Since the agenda-setting stage is very much influenced by the public and 
media. In the implementation stages it would be interesting to compare different 
countries’ domestic lobby groupings and investigate the lobby groups exerting 
most influence at this stage. Furthermore it would also be interesting to look into 
principal-agent theory and responsiveness of the lobbyists exerting most 
influence, in order to see if the lobbyists actually represent the interests of the 
represented.  
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